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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 890546-CA
Priority No. 2

LEROY RAYMOND JACKSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant Leroy Raymond Jackson relies on his
opening brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the
statements of jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts.
Appellant responds to the State's answer to his opening brief as
follows.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A circumstance indicative of a "seizure" includes the
aggressive manner in which Officer Hurst blocked Appellant Jackson's
car.

Officer Hurst testified to another factor supportive of a

seizure when he indicated that Jackson was the target of his
investigation.

The court clearly erred in misinterpreting the facts

and the reasoning of the cases cited by Appellant Jackson,
particularly the decision of United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384
(9th Cir. 1989) . Finally, the officer's conduct cannot be justified
by the fruits of the illegal seizure.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT BELIEVED THAT HE WAS NOT FREE TO LEAVE.
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief)
A.

A SEIZURE OCCURRED WHEN THE OFFICER BLOCKED
APPELLANT'S CAR.

In its brief, the State cited United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544 (1980), for the well-recognized standard applicable to
the case at bar:
A "seizure" under the fourth amendment occurs when a
reasonable person in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident believes he or she is not
free to leave. United States v. Mendenhall. 446
U.S. 544, 554 (1980). Example[s) of circumstances
indicating a seizure are as follows: (1) the
threatening presence of several officers, (2) the
display of a weapon by an officer, (3) some physical
touching of the citizen, or (4) the use of language
or tone of a voice indicating that compliance with
the officer's request might be compelled.
Mendenhall. 446 U.S. at 554.
Appellee's Brief at 6.

Appellant Jackson agrees with the Mendenhall

standard, Appellant's Brief at 19, but notes that "the test is
flexible," Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 100 L.Ed.2d 565,
573, 108 S.Ct. 1975 (1988), and encompasses other circumstances
indicative of a seizure:
[5] The police activated a siren or flasher; [6]
they commanded respondent to halt, or displayed any
weapons; or [7] thev operated the car in a
aggressive manner to block respondent's course or
otherwise control the direction or speed of his
movement.
100 L.Ed.2d at 573 (emphasis added).
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In the instant action, Officer Hurst operated his car in an
aggressive manner by blocking Jackson's car and his access out of
the parking lot.1

See Appellant's brief, Point I.

Officer Hurst

had just "followed" [Jackson's] car into the parking lot," (MS 17),
despite the fact that Jackson had not committed a traffic
violation.

(T 7, 27). Hovering close by, Officer Hurst watched

Jackson maneuver into a parking stall.

(MS 17-18).

During

Jackson's maneuvering, he faced each and every point of the compass,
(MS 17, 18, 23); (T 7-8), and observed Officer Hurst's marked patrol
car.
Jackson then watched Officer Hurst drive his patrol car
directly in front2 of him.

Officer Hurst was admittedly moving into

position from a nearby location just before Jackson had stopped his
car. (T 9). According to Hurst, "[a]s soon as [Jackson] exited [his
car], I stopped my car." (T 9). Not only was Hurst quickly upon
Jackson, blocking his car by simply stopping the patrol car, Hurst
also made clear what his intentions were by stopping less than one
car length in front of Jackson's car. (T 52).

The trial court

1

Appellant Jackson reemphasizes that the seizure occurred
initially when Officer Hurst blocked Jackson's car. Appellant's
brief at 17-18. Even if Jackson's person may have, in fact, been
free to walk away, the initial seizure of Jackson's car cannot be
ignored. Restraining Jackson's movement by blocking his car is akin
to falsely imprisoning an individual by retaining control over his
or her property, (e.g. a wallet or a purse)
2

When referring to the location of the cars, Appellant's
brief uses the term "directly in front" in conformity with Officer
Hurst's reference to the front of Jackson's car which faced south.
(T 8) (Jackson's car "pulled straight back into another stall in the
north side of the parking lot").
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discredited Hurst's testimony that Jackson had enough room to
maneuver past the parked patrol car. (T 52).
Officer Hurst could have parked on either side of Jackson's
car, (T 16-17), but chose instead to block Appellant's car.

A fence

blocked Jackson's exit to the north, (MS 23), Officer Hurst's patrol
car blocked the exit to the south, (T 51), and, unless Jackson
walked completely around the parked patrol car, his exit to the east
was blocked as well.

As recognized by the trial court, "[t]he

police officer upon stopping [his patrol car], however, did block
[Jackson's] automobile, and for me [the Court] to find otherwise,
frankly, would be intellectually dishonest."

(T 51).

Officer Hurst's conduct thus constituted a seizure as he
"operated the car in an aggressive manner to block [Jackson's]
course or otherwise control the direction or speed of his movement."
Michigan v. Chesternut. 100 L.Ed.2d at 573; cf. United States v.
Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1987) (when an officer blocked a
one-lane driveway, the defendant's freedom to leave was eliminated
and the trial "courts's suggestion that [the defendant] could have
backed around the [officer's] car or ignored [the officer] defies
common sense").

Moreover, had Jackson attempted to walk west, Hurst

"would have demanded a driver's license."

(T 27).

Appellant

Jackson could not have moved freely in any direction.
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B.

IF APPELLANT STOPPED AND EXITED HIS CAR IN
RESPONSE TO OFFICER HURST'S APPEARANCE AND
CONDUCT, THE ENCOUNTER CANNOT BE DEEMED
VOLUNTARY.

The State attempted to justify the trial court's ruling by
stressing that, "[g]iyen Judge Murphy's finding of fact3 that
defendant voluntarily initiated the encounter as a pedestrian,
defendant fails to come forward with any factually similar case law
which [concludes that a seizure occurred through the application of]
[F]ourth [A]mendment legal standards." Appellee's brief at 13. Not
only does the State ignore United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384 (9th
Cir. 1987), it also discounts the reasoning underlying each cited
opinion.

See Appellee's brief at 13 n.6; Appellant's Reply brief n.
For example, in Kerr, defendant Kerr "was approximately

forty to fifty feet from the patrol car [when he] left his own car
and met Deputy Hedrick on foot." 817 F.2d at 1385.

Deputy Hedrick

3

When an appellate court reviews the findings of a bench
trial, the findings are rejected if they are "clearly erroneous."
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). The clearly erroneous
standard differs from the "sufficiently inconclusive" or
"insubstantial" jury verdict standard because in the former, the
appellate court does not simply view the evidence "most favorable to
the appellee" or resolve all conflicts and inferences "in his
favor." Compare Walker, 743 P.2d at 192-93, with State v. Petree,
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). Rather,
[if] the trial court's verdict in a criminal case
[is] against the clear weight of the evidence, or if
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made,
the . . . verdict will be set aside.
Walker, 743 P.2d at 193.

had just made a U-turn and entered a driveway to block Kerr's
passageway.

The Ninth Circuit held that, even though defendant Kerr

had "initiated" the encounter by approaching the Deputy first, "Kerr
stopped and exited his car primarily in response to Deputy Hedrick's
official appearance and conduct, rather than of his own volition."
Id. at 1386.

"Deputy Hedrick's conduct thus precipitated the

confrontation with Kerr." Id. at 1387.
In the present case, Officer had also just made a U-turn
and entered the driveway of a parking lot. (T 7 ) ; (MS 17). Yet,
Officer Hurst, unlike Deputy Hedrick, made sure that his "suspect"
could not leave when he moved his patrol car directly in front of
Jackson's car. Compare (T 9, 52) with Kerr. 817 F.2d at 1387. The
State has not distinguished the facts or reasoning of Kerr, nor has
it rebutted the fact that Jackson was the target of Officer Hurst's
investigation. See Appellant's brief at 18 and Point II; Kerr, 817
F.2d at 1387 (Kerr could have "reasonably perceived that he was the
target of Deputy Hedrick's investigation and thus was not free to
leave").
According to Officer Hurst, he testified that he had two
purposes in following the vehicle: "to know any possible suspect's
name" (Jackson was the only individual in the car) and "to find out
who the car belonged to." (T 20-21).

His testimony confirmed the

nature of his "investigation":
Q.

[By counsel] And you wanted to know any
possible suspect's name if you could learn it?

A.

[By Hurst]

Yes
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Q.

You didn't have any other facts about the
robbery at that time?

A.

No.

Q.

You weren't going to be able to proceed
investigating that, really, were you?

A.

It all depended on what I found,

Q.

Excuse me.

A.

It all depended on what I found.

Q.

What were you looking for that would have
assisted you?

A.

I don't know.

Q.

How would that have helped you?

A.

To find out who he was.

Q.

Now, knowing who he was, was there anything
else further that you could do at that time to
investigate the Postal Shop robbery?

A.

As soon as I found out who he was, that was
about it.

Q.

Okay.

A.

I wanted to find out who the car belonged to,
also.

Identification, initially.

(T 21) (emphasis added) (Addendum A).

Appellant Jackson was

unquestionably the target of Officer Hurst's "fishing expedition."
Despite the trial court' ruling that "there [was] no articulable
suspicion to stop the defendant [Jackson] prior to the time that the
officer indicated the he had placed the defendant under arrest,"
(T 51), the court clearly erred in its decision to disregard the
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precipitating questioning and conduct4 by Officer Hurst and allow,
over Appellant's objections, the evidence ultimately found on
Jackson's person.

(R 33); (T 51-53).

4

With its emphasis on Appellant Jackson's "initiation" of
the encounter, the State is essentially arguing "that the Fourth
Amendment is never implicated until an individual stops in response
to the police's show of authority." Michigan v. Chesternut, 100
L.Ed.2d at 571. The U.S. Supreme Court has previously rejected this
argument because "petitioner [the State] would have us rule that a
lack of objective and particularized suspicion would not poison
police conduct, no matter how coercive, as long as the police did
not succeed in actually apprehending the individual." Id.
In Chesternut, respondent Michael Chesternut turned to run
in the opposite direction of an approaching police car. The car
"quickly caught up with respondent and drove alongside him for a
short distance. As [the car] drove beside him the officers observed
respondent discard a number of packets. Id. at 569. After
inspecting the packets, an officer discovered that they contained
pills and surmised that the pills contained codeine. The officers
arrested Chesternut for the possession of narcotics. Id.
While the principles of Chesternut are helpful, some
differences should be noted. The Chesternut Court held that "the
police conduct involved here would not have communicated to the
reasonable person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon
respondent's freedom of movement." 100 L.Ed.2d at 573.
Nevertheless, unlike the police conduct in Chesternut, Officer
Hurst's conduct in the instant action clearly communicated his
intent to restrain Appellant Jackson's freedom of movement. Jackson
could not move his car at all and his individual movement was
unreasonably confined to one point of the compass. Appellant
Jackson does not contend that officers are never able to pursue
unarticularized hunches, see Appellant's brief, Point III, but
submits that under the existing circumstances, Officer Hurst's
conduct, unlike the officers in Chesternut, satisfied the
aforementioned example indicative of a seizure: aggressively
blocking Appellant Jackson's car. 100 L.Ed.2d at 573.
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POINT II
THE OFFICER'S CONDUCT CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED IN HINDSIGHT
(Reply to Point II of Appellee's Brief)
The State contends that "Judge Murphy specifically found
that Hurst's request for identification was reasonable," Appellee's
brief at 16, but fails to add the court's reasoning:

"upon

defendent's statement that he had no driver's license, a reasonable
suspicion arose that ^ crime or infraction had been committed, that
is, driving without a license, and the defendant had committed that
crime or infraction." (T 52).

"That reasoning, however,

'justify[ing] the arrest by the search and at the same time . . .
the search by the arrest,' just 'will not do.'" Smith v. Ohio, 494
U.S.

, 108 L.Ed.2d 464, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 1289 (1990).

In a

per curiam opinion, the Smith Court ruled that a search is not
justified when its legality is based solely upon the evidence seized
during the search. Id.

Police cannot maintain the circular

argument, the Court held, that the search was properly incident to
an arrest that could be justified only by the fruits of the search.
Id.

The Smith reasoning should apply with equal force to Appellant

Jackson's case.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Jackson respectfully
requests that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded to
the trial court for a new trial or dismissal.
SUBMITTED this

^X(

day of June, 1990.

KAREN STAM
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

£
RONkLD S ,v FUJINO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that eight copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 3-\

day of June, 1990.

RONALD S> FUJINO
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ADDENDUM A

1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
STATE OF UTAH,
4
Plaintiff/Respondent,
5
vs.

Case No. 891900795

6
LEROY RAYMOND JACKSON,
7
Defendant/Appellant.
8
9
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
10

July 11, 1989
August 14, 1989
October 2, 1989

11
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BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY
District Court Judge

14
15

A P P E A R A N C E S ;

16

For the State:

Gregory Skourdas
Deputy County Attorney
235 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

For Defendant:

Debra K. Loy
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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